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7.1 Introduction
Prior to commercialization, the Internet was available only to re-
searchers and educators. Less than a decade after commercialization,
more than half the households in the United States were online according
to the National Telecommunications Information Administration (NTIA;
2001). The Internet access industry generated 15.6 billion dollars in rev-
enue in 2001 (U.S. Department of Commerce 2003, 733). This growth pre-
sents many challenges for measuring the contribution of the Internet to
gross domestic product (GDP). In this study we consider the formulation
of consumer price indexes for commercial Internet access. We focus on
constructing an index for the earliest period of growth of dial-up service,
when the challenges for index construction are greatest.
No simple measurement strategy will suﬃce for formulating price in-
dexes for Internet activity. On average, more than two-thirds of time online
is spent at so-called free sites. Many of these are simply browserware or
Usenet clubs for which there is no explicit charge. Some of these are partly
or fully advertising-supported sites. Households also divide time between
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responsibility.activities that generate revenue directly from use. For example, most elec-
tronic retailing does not charge for browsing but does charge per transac-
tion. Other media sites, such as pornography, newspaper archival, and
some music, charge directly for participation (Goldfarb 2004).
There is one place, however, where almost every household transacts
money for service. Internet service providers (ISPs) provide the point of
connection for the vast majority of household users, charging for such a
connection. From the outset of commercialization, most users moved
away from ISPs at not-for-proﬁt institutions, such as higher education
(Clemente 1998). Far more than 90 percent of household use was aﬃliated
with commercial providers (NTIA 2001). This continues today.
In this paper we investigate the pricing behavior at ISPs from 1993 to
1999 with the goal of generating price indexes. We begin with the earliest
point when we could ﬁnd data, 1993, when the commercial ISP market was
still nascent. We stop in 1999 for a number of reasons. For one, the indus-
try takes a new turn with the AOL/Time Warner merger in early 2000, an
event that we believe alters strategies for accounting for qualitative change.
Second, until the merger many industry sources indicate that all online pro-
viders followed the same technological trajectory. This helps us construct
indexes without data on market share, which we lack. Third, and some-
what independently, broadband began to diﬀuse just near the end of our
sample. After a few years, it connected enough households to inﬂuence In-
ternet price indexes and would require us to alter the procedures carried
out in this paper. Finally, spring 2000 marks the end of unqualiﬁed opti-
mism about the persistence of the Internet boom. This change in mood was
aﬃliated with restructuring of the ISP industry, potentially bringing about
a marked departure in price trends.
Using a new data set about the early period, we compute a variety of
price indexes under many diﬀerent methods. The results show that ISP
pricing has been falling rapidly over time. The bulk of the price decline is
in the early years of the sample, especially between early 1995 and the
spring of 1996. We also ﬁnd a 20 percent decline in price per unit of ISP
quality for the thirty-three-month period between late 1996 and early 1999.
We assess alternative models that vary in their attention to aspects of qual-
itative change. We ﬁnd that this attention matters. Accounting for qualita-
tive change shapes the estimates of price declines and the recorded timing
of those declines.
This paper is unique in that it is the ﬁrst to investigate a large sample of
U.S.-based ISPs. This setting gives rise to a combination of familiar and
unique challenges for measurement. This novelty and challenge should be
understood in context. There have been many papers on hedonic price in-
dexes in electronic goods (Berndt and Griliches 1993; Berndt, Griliches,
and Rappaport 1995; Berndt and Rappaport 2001) and new industries,
such as automobiles (Griliches 1961; Raﬀ and Trajtenberg 1997). We bor-
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overview). There is also another paper about prices at Canadian ISPs (see
Prud’homme and Yu 1999), which has some similarities to our setting,
though involving many fewer ﬁrms.
This is one of the ﬁrst papers to investigate and apply these hedonic
methods to estimate price indexes for a service good. In this setting, phys-
ical attributes are not key features of the service, but features of the con-
tract for service are. These features can improve quite rapidly from one
year to the next as contracting modes change, as new entrants experiment
with new service models for delivery, and as technological change alters the
scope of possible services available to ISPs. Our primary goal is to under-
stand hedonic price indexes in such an evolving market.
Many, but not all, ISPs oﬀer more than one type of contract for service.
In our data there is no one-to-one association between ﬁrm and the fea-
tures of service. This provides some challenges for measurement, as well
as some opportunities. We compare alternative ways to control for unob-
served quality at the level of the ISP. This is another novelty, albeit a small
one for the results.
We view this paper as one small step in a much larger research enterprise,
measuring the economic changes brought about from the diﬀusion of and
improvement in the Internet. There is much distance between our histori-
cal exercise and an ideal cost-of-living index for the Internet (Greenstein
2002). During the time period under examination, the Internet underwent
dramatic changes. The quality of what users got from the Internet sky-
rocketed. Said another way, what the user did with the service they got from
an ISP also changed dramatically over this time period. We measure only
a small piece of that dramatic change in experience.
7.2 A Brief History of Internet Service Providers in the United States
The Internet began as a defense department research project to develop
networking technologies more reliable than existing daisy-chained net-
works. The ﬁrst product of this research was the Advanced Research Proj-
ects Agency Network (ARPAnet). Stewardship was handed to the National
Science Foundation (NSF) in the mid-1980s, which established NSFnet,
another experimental network for universities and their research collabo-
rators. The NSF’s charter prohibited private users from using the infra-
structure for commercial purposes, which was not problematic until the
network grew. By 1990, the transmission control protocol/Internet proto-
col (TCP/IP) network had reached a scale that would shortly exceed
NSF’s needs. For these and related reasons, the NSF implemented a series
of steps to privatize the Internet. These steps began in 1992 and were com-
pleted by 1995. Diﬀusion to households also began to accelerate around
1995, partly as a consequence of these steps as well as due to the commer-
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(Greenstein 2001).
7.2.1 The Origins of Internet Functionality and Pricing
A household employs commercial Internet providers for many services,
most of which had their origins in the ARPAnet or NSFnet. The most
predominant means of communications is e-mail. The e-mail equivalent
of bulk mail is called a listserv, where messages are distributed to a wide
audience of subscribers. These listservs are a form of conferencing that is
based around a topic or theme. Usenet or newsgroups are the Internet
equivalent of bulletin board discussion groups. Messages are posted for all
to see, and readers can respond or continue the conversation with addi-
tional postings. Chat rooms serve as a forum for real-time chat. “Instant-
messaging” has gained increased popularity, but the basic idea is quite old
in computing science: users can communicate directly and instantaneously
with other users in private chatlike sessions.
Some tools have been supplanted, but the most common are World Wide
Web (WWW) browsers, gopher, telnet, ﬁle transfer protocol (ftp), archie,
and wais. Browsers and content have grown in sophistication from the one-
line interface designed by Tim Berners-Lee, beginning with Lynx, then
Mosaic, and, more recently, Netscape Navigator, Internet Explorer, and
the open-source browser, Opera. The Internet and WWW are now used
for news and entertainment, commerce, messaging, research, application
hosting, videoconferencing, and so on. The availability of rich content
continues to grow, driving demand for greater bandwidth and broadband
connectivity.
Pricing by ISPs requires a physical connection. The architecture of the
Internet necessitates this physical connection. Both under the academic
and commercial network, as shown in ﬁgure 7.1, the structure of the Inter-
net is organized as a hierarchical tree. Each layer of connectivity is de-
pendent on a layer one level above it. The connection from a computer to
the Internet reaches back through the ISP to the major backbone pro-
viders. The lowest level of the Internet is the customer’s computer or net-
work. These are connected to the Internet through an ISP. An ISP will
maintain their own subnetwork, connecting their points of presences
(POPs) and servers with Internet protocol (IP) networks. These local ac-
cess providers derive their connectivity to the wider Internet from other
providers upstream, either regional or national ISPs. Regional networks
connect directly to the national backbone providers. Private backbone pro-
viders connect to public (government) backbones at network access points.
7.2.2 The Emergence of Pricing and Services at Commercial Firms
An ISP is a service ﬁrm that provides its customers with access to the In-
ternet. These are several types of “access providers.” At the outset of the in-
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providers” (OSPs; Meeker and Dupuy 1996), and ﬁrms called “commer-
cial online services” by Krol (1992). Internet service providers oﬀer Inter-
net access to individual, business, and corporate Internet users, oﬀering a
wide variety of services in addition to access, which will be discussed in the
following. Most OSPs evolved into ISPs around 1995–1996, oﬀering the
connectivity of ISPs with a greater breadth of additional services and con-
tent.
Most households physically connect through dial-up service, although
both cable and broadband technologies gained some use among house-
holds near the end of the millennium.1 Dial-up connections are usually
made with local toll calls or calls to a toll-free number (to avoid long-
distance charges). Corporations often make the physical connection
through leased lines or other direct connections. Smaller ﬁrms may con-
nect using dial-up technology. These physical connections are made
through the networks and infrastructure of competitive location exchange
companies, incumbent location exchange companies (such as Regional
Bell Operating Companies), and other communications ﬁrms. Large ISPs
may maintain their own network for some of the data traﬃc and routing;
the largest ﬁrms often lease their equipment to other ISPs for use by their
customers. Smaller ISPs are responsible for the call handling equipment
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Fig. 7.1 The organization of the Internet
1. Approximately 5 percent of U.S. households subscribed to a broadband connection as of
2000; see NTIA (2001).(modems, routers, access concentrators, etc.) and their own connections to
the Internet, but in some locations they may lease services for traveling cus-
tomers.
Charging for access occurs at the point of access by phone. Internet ser-
vice providers generally maintain POPs where banks of modems let users
dial in with a local phone call to reach a digital line to the Internet. Re-
gional or national ISPs set up POPs in many cities, so customers do not
have to make a long-distance call to reach the ISP oﬃces in another town.
Commercial online services, such as America Online, have thousands of
POPs across many countries that they either run themselves or lease
through a third party.
Many ISPs provide services that complement the physical connection.
The most important and necessary service is an address for the user’s com-
puter. All Internet packet traﬃc has a “from” and “to” address that allows
it to be routed to the right destination. An ISP assigns each connecting user
with an address from its own pool of available addresses. ISPs oﬀer other
services in addition to the network addresses. These may include e-mail
servers, newsgroup servers, portal content, online account management,
customer service, technical support, Internet training, ﬁle space and stor-
age, Web-site hosting, and web development and design. Software is also
provided, either privately labeled or by third parties. Some of it is a stan-
dard component of the ISP contract (Greenstein 2000b; O’Donnell 2001).
Some ISPs also recommend and sell customer equipment they guarantee
will be compatible with the ISP’s access equipment.
Internet service providers diﬀer in size. The national private backbone
providers (i.e., MCI, Sprint, etc.) are the largest ISPs. The remaining ISPs
range in size and scale from wholesale regional ﬁrms down to the local ISP
handling a small number of dial-in customers. There are also many large na-
tional providers who geographically serve the entire country. Many of these
are familiar names such as Earthlink/Sprint, AT&T, IBM Global Network,
Mindspring, Netcom, PSINet, and so on. The majority of providers provide
limited geographic coverage. A larger wholesale ISP serves all ISPs further
up the connectivity chain. Local ISPs derive connectivity from regional
ISPs who connect to the national private backbone providers. A large dial-
up provider may have a national presence with hundreds of POPs, while a
local ISP may serve a very limited geographic market.
It is diﬃcult to describe modal pricing behavior for ISPs over time. The
most likely date for the existence of the ﬁrst commercial ISPs is 1991–1992,
when the NSF began to allow commercialization of theInternet.2In one of
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2. PSINet, a now bankrupt ISP, used to claim that it was the ﬁrst commercial ISP, oﬀering
connection in 1991 though many others have also made a similar claim. The history is cloudy
because it is unclear whether the NSF “allowed” connection or some ﬁrms connected in vio-
lation of the restrictions against commercial behavior and, needing an excuse to privatize,
NSF ﬁgured out how to accommodate such behavior.the earliest Internet handbooks, Krol (1992) lists 45 North American pro-
viders (eight have national presence). In the second edition of the same
book, Krol (1994) lists 86 North American providers (10 have national
presence). Marine et al. (1993) lists 28 North American ISPs and six for-
eign ISPs. Schneider (1996) lists 882 U.S. ISPs and 149 foreign ISPs.
Meeker and Dupuy (1996) reports that there are over 3,000 ISPs, and the
Fall 1996 Boardwatch Magazine’s Directory of Internet Service Providers
lists 2,934 ﬁrms in North America. This growth was accompanied by vast
heterogeneity in service, access, and pricing. Descriptions of regional and
wholesale connectivity (see Boardwatch Magazine’s Directory of Internet
Service Providers [1996]) imply that contracts are short term.
7.2.3 Pricing Behavior at Commercial Firms and How It Changed
Prior to the Internet, there were many bulletin boards and other private
networks. The bulletin boards were primarily text-based venues where
users with similar interests connected, exchanged e-mail, downloaded or
uploaded ﬁles, and occasionally participated in chat rooms. The private
networks or OSPs (e.g., AOL, CompuServe, Genie, and Prodigy) had sim-
ilar functionality, with segregated content areas for diﬀerent interests.
Users could post and download ﬁles and read and post interest group mes-
sages (similar to today’s Internet newsgroups, but usually moderated).
These forums (as they were called on CompuServe) were often centered on
a speciﬁc topic and served as a customer service venue for companies. The
pricing structure of the majority of these services was a subscription
change (on a monthly or yearly basis) and possibly an hourly fee for usage.
At this early stage, circa 1992–1993, most users would batch together the
work they needed to do online, connect, and quickly upload and download
ﬁles, e-mail, and messages. Then they would disconnect, minimizing time
online. Specialized software existed to facilitate this process. When ISPs
ﬁrst commercialized in 1992, there were similar expectations that users
would continue to use the Internet in such bursts of time.
Because much of the usage was for uploading and downloading, it was
sensible to charge more for faster access. Pricing by speed is close to pric-
ing by volume (or pricing for traﬃc). Consequently, many ISPs services
varied the hourly charge based on the speed of the connection. In the early
1990s, speeds moved from 300 bytes per second (bps) to 1,200; 2,400;
4,800; 9,600; and eventually to 14,400 and 28,800. The latter two were the
norm of the mid 1990s. 56k (or, on some lines, 43,000bps) became the norm
in the latter part of the 1990s.
As speeds changed and as behavior changed, a variety of pricing plans
emerged. Price plans began to oﬀer larger amounts of hours that were in-
cluded in the monthly fee and oﬀered marginal pricing above those in-
cluded hours. These plans oﬀered traditional nonlinear pricing or quantity
discounts. In these plans, the marginal hours would be priced lower than
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following.
Only later, after the ISP industry began to develop and mature, and users
demonstrated preferences for a browsing behavior, pricing began to shift
to unlimited usage for a ﬁxed monthly price. These plans are commonly re-
ferred to as “ﬂat-rate” or “unlimited” plans. These unlimited plans caused
capacity issues at POPs because the marginal cost to the user was zero, and
some users remained online much longer. Internet service providers re-
acted to this behavior by introducing plans with hourly limits and high
marginal pricing above the limit. Most such plans were not particularly
binding unless the user remained online for hours at a time most days of the
month. Some ISPs also instituted automatic session termination when an
online user remained inactive, eliminating problems arising from users
who forgot to log oﬀ. However, this was perceived as poor service by some
customers; consequently, many small ISPs hesitated to employ it.
7.2.4 The Structure of the ISP Market and Pricing
The ISP market began to experience explosive entry around 1995, ac-
celerating after the commercialization of the browser around the same
time. Early movers in this market had experience with the network used in
higher education. Firms such as PSINet, IBM, and MCI tried to stake po-
sitions as reliable providers for business and each achieved some initial
success.
A signal event in 1995–1996 was the entry of AT&T’s Worldnet service,
which was ﬁrst aimed at business in late 1995 and then explicitly marketed
at households in early 1996. It became associated with reliable e-mail and
browsing as well as ﬂat-rate pricing at $20 a month, which imposed pricing
pressure on other ISPs throughout the country. This service quickly grew
to over a million users within a year, though its market growth eventually
stalled. Indeed, it never met forecasts from 1995 that it would dominate the
market because, in eﬀect, its competitors also grew rapidly. Growing de-
mand for all services meant that no player achieved dominance for several
years (Greenstein 2001).
The online service providers—Prodigy, Genie, CompuServe, MSN, and
AOL—all began converting to Internet service around 1995, with some
providing service earlier than others. All failed to gain much additional
market share from this move except AOL, who used this conversion as an
opportunity to alter their service’s basic features. That said, AOL’s con-
version was not smooth. When AOL converted fully to Internet access in
1996, it experienced a diﬃcult transition. Management underanticipated
their own users’ responses to the introduction of ﬂat-rate pricing. This bad
publicity also facilitated further entry by other ﬁrms looking to pick up
customers who ﬂed the busy phone lines. AOL survived the bad publicity
through a series of new investments in facilities and intense marketing.
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plorer, which allowed it to grow at Microsoft Network’s (MSN’s) expense,
who had been one of its big competitors until that point (Cusumano and
Yoﬃe 1998). Furthermore, in 1998 AOL bought CompuServe, a merger
that, in retrospect, initiated it on the path toward solidifying its leadership
of dial-up service.3
Another important change was due to consolidation, especially in 1998.
AOL sold oﬀ its physical facilities in 1996. When IBM sold its facilities to
AT&T in 1997, AT&T became one of the largest business providers of ac-
cess in the United States. When MCI and Uunet eventually became part of
WorldCom in 1998 (subject to a restructuring and sell-oﬀ of MCI’s back-
bone, as mandated by the Department of Justice) WorldCom became the
largest backbone provider in the United States and one of the largest re-
sellers of national POPs to other ﬁrms.
Neither AT&T’s entry, nor IBM’s or MCI’s positioning, had satisﬁed all
new demand. After 1995, thousands of small entrepreneurial ventures also
grew throughout the country and gained enough market share to sustain
themselves. New entrants, such as Erols, Earthlink, Mindspring, Main
One, Verio, and many others, gained large market positions. The entry
(and exit) continued through 1999. Private label ISPs also emerged when
associations and aﬃliation groups oﬀered rebranded Internet access to
their members. These groups did not own or operate an ISP. Instead, their
access was being repackaged from the original ISP and rebranded.
By 1997 more than 92 percent of the U.S. population had access to a
competitive market ﬁlled with a wide variety of options. Another 5 percent
of the population—found in many diﬀerent rural locations throughout
the United States—had access to at least one ﬁrm by a local phone call
(Downes and Greenstein 2002). Economies of scale and barriers to entry
were quite low, so thousands of ﬁrms were able to sustain their businesses.
Roughly speaking, market share was quite skewed. A couple dozen of the
largest ﬁrms accounted for 75 percent of market share and a couple hun-
dred for 90 percent of market share, but there was so much turnover and
ﬂuctuation that estimates more precise than this were diﬃcult to develop.
Just prior to the AOL/Time Warner Merger in 1999–2000, the ISP mar-
ket remained in ﬂux. Broadband connections (digital subscriber line [DSL]
or cable) began to become available in select places—primarily urban ar-
eas, oﬀering these home users a faster and possibly richer experience. The
so-called free-ISP model also emerged in late 1998 and grew rapidly in
1999, oﬀering free Internet access in exchange for advertisements placed
on the users’ screen. These ﬁrms eventually signed up several million
households. The scope of service also continued to diﬀer among ISPs, with
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3. In 1999, AOL bought Netscape, well after the browser wars. The merger with Time
Warner was proposed in 2000.no emergence of a norm for what constituted minimal or maximal service.
Some ISPs oﬀered simple service for low prices, while other ISPs oﬀered
many additional services, charging for some of these services and bundling
other services in standard contracts.
Stated succinctly, over a six-year period there were many changes in the
modal contract form and user behavior. Variations in the delivery of ser-
vices and changes in user expectations resulted in numerous qualitative
changes in the basic service experienced by all users. All players were
buﬀeted by many of the same competitive forces.
7.2.5 Turbulent Times and Price Indexes
In a market as turbulent as this one, we are quite skeptical of traditional
price-index construction using only measured prices weighted by market
share, unaltered for qualitative change and competitive conditions. Our
working hypotheses are simple: (a) it will be diﬃcult to execute matched-
model methods; (b) not accounting for quality will lead to problematic in-
dicators of the true state of the market. Why are these hypotheses our start-
ing point?
First, large improvement in the quality of service occurred and went un-
measured. These changes were widespread and not unique to any particu-
lar ﬁrm. They happened too frequently to be measured. Every surviving
ﬁrm, whether big or small, had to experiment often with alternative modes
for delivery and diﬀerent features in the service.
Second, market share was frequently in ﬂux, and such changes were
likely to fall below the radar screen of any government price record. Ex-
perimentation enabled many new entrants to succeed in growing market
share well after commercialization began. Yet data on market share nor-
mally is collected by government agencies at a frequency of two or three
years at most. This only coarsely reﬂects the rapid addition of new users
over time.
Third, marketwide experimentation imposed competitive pressure on
incumbent behavior, even when these were very large ﬁrms. Behaving as if
they were “paranoid,” the most nimble largest ﬁrms of this era, such as
AOL and Earthlink, did not stand still.4 Incumbent ISPs were compelled
to make frequent releases of upgrades to their software, to spend lavishly
on marketing, to add new features constantly, and to keep prices low by not
charging for extras—to prevent the growing young ﬁrms from cutting into
the incumbents’ leads. Yet most of these competitive outcomes, except
nominal prices, were not measured. In short, while it is often satisfactory
to ignore the behavior of small fringe ﬁrms, that omission (or de-emphasis)
could lead us to throw away useful information. If the large and small acted
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4. This paranoia appeared justiﬁed as the least nimble ﬁrms, such as AT&T WorldNet, did
not keep up and, consequently, did not prosper (after a spectacular start in 1995–1996).as if they were close substitutes, the small ﬁrms provide information about
the unmeasured activities of the large.
In summary, quality changed so rapidly that market share bounced
around, and the large ﬁrms acted as if they were afraid of losing market
share to the small. These observations will push us to examine the behav-
ior of all ﬁrms in this market and not just the top dozen.5
7.3 Data Set Description
The data set used in this paper is compiled chieﬂy from issues of Board-
watch Magazine’s Directory of Internet Service Providers (1996–1999). The
directory debuted in 1996 and continued to be published through 1999.
Since 1998, the same publisher has maintained a list of ISPs at http://www
.thelist.com. Before the directory was published, Boardwatch Magazine
published lists of Internet service providers in its regular magazine. These
issues date from November 1993 until July 1995. Another handful of ob-
servations in the data set were collected from the contemporaneous “how-
to” Internet books that are listed in the references.
The sample covers the time period from November 1993 until January
1999, approximately a six-year period. The sample is an unbalanced panel,
tracking a total of 5,948 ﬁrms with a total of 19,217 price-plan observa-
tions.6 The data set consists of demographic information about the ISP
(name, location, phone, and Web address). In each year there are a variety
of other characteristics of the ISP that are measured, including whether
they are a national provider, how many area codes they serve, presence of
upstream bandwidth, and their total number of ports. There is additional
data from a survey/test done by Boardwatch, tallying the percentage of
calls completed and the average speed of actual connections for the na-
tional providers in 1998, though we will only partially use this data in this
paper.
Each ISP is associated with one or more price plans from a given time
period. Each price plan observation includes the connection speed,
monthly fee, and whether the plan oﬀers limited or unlimited access. If ac-
cess is limited, then there is information on the hourly limit threshold and
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5. We could also appeal to precedent. A fair number of hedonic studies for PC software and
hardware have used unweighted sales data for their estimation of quality-adjusted price in-
dexes. For example, see Berndt and Rappaport (2001) on PC hardware, or Pakes (2002), or
Berndt (1991) more generally.
6. This data does not represent all ﬁrms in the industry. Two or three price plans generally
listed by Boardwatch for any given provider at one speciﬁc time represent most, but not all,
plans available from that ISP. Greenstein (2000b) conﬁrms that the Boardwatch data was in-
complete in terms of the number of plans actually oﬀered by an ISP. However, Boardwatch
does state that the plans represent “the majority of users at an ISP or the most frequently cho-
sen plans.” As table 7.1, documents, 25 observations are drawn from November 1993; 47 from
January 1995; 1,283 from May 1996; 2,822 from August 1996; 3,813 from March 1997; 5,659
from January 1998; and 5,568 from January 1999.the cost of additional hours. In a given year, there may be multiple price-
plan records for a given ﬁrm because they oﬀer a variety of plans at diﬀer-
ent connection speeds. The published information generally gives pricing
for 28.8k access as well as higher-speed access.7
Table 7.1 summarizes the number of observations in the panel. Four ob-
servations from the ﬁrst two years were dropped due to the fact that they
were extreme outliers. They certainly were unpopular, but because we lack
market share, they had an overwhelming and undue impact on the early
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7. Boardwatchmildly changed its formats from one year to the next. Depending on the year,
this higher-speed plan could be for 64k or 128k ISDN access or for 56k access. It should be
noted that the price plans for these higher speeds included no information about hourly lim-
itations or marginal prices. We have chosen to treat them as unlimited plans. The other choice
would be to attribute the same hourly limitations as the slower plan from the same ﬁrm in the
same year, but we have no basis for doing so.
Table 7.1 ISP price dataset: Counts of ﬁrms and observations, by year
11/1993 1/1995 5/1996 8/1996 3/1997 1/1998 1/1999 Total
Directory ﬁrmsa 24 35 2,934 3,535 4,167 4,511
Sample ﬁrmsb 710
Total observations 25 47 1,283 2,822 3,813 5,659 5,568
Speedsc
14.4k 25 42 67
28.8k 5 702 2,822 3,367 3,972 2,562 13,430
56k 446 1,564 3,006 5,016
ISDN 64k 299 54 353
ISDN 128k 282 282
T1 1.544mb 69 69
Limited hours 13 22 303 996 1,024 1,130 581
Unlimited 12 25 980 1,826 2,789 4,529 4,987
% Limited 52 47 24 35 27 20 10
28.8k speed
Limited hours 2 303 996 1,024 1,130 581
Unlimited 3 399 1,826 2,343 2,842 1,981
% Limited 40 43 35 30 28 23
Note: The data set comprises all data published by the data sources listed in the references. The sole ex-
ception is the 5/1996 data, which represents a random sample of 710 ﬁrms from a total population of
~2,050 ﬁrms. The overall results presented in this paper are insensitive to the inclusion or exclusion of
this subset of observations.
aSome ﬁrms disappear from the published data, and others continue to be listed without price plan in-
formation. We are not sure of the fate of these ﬁrms, though it is likely that the ones that disappear have
either been consolidated or failed. Firms that continue to appear without price data provide evidence
that Boardwatch did in fact continue to monitor and update the pricing in their listings. This eliminates
some bias in the results that would have occurred if the prices were not up to date.
bSome ﬁrms listed in the data sources did not have price plan information. That is why there are few ﬁrms
represented in the data sample.
cNumber of observations at each speed by year.price-index results. No other cleaning of the data has been done, apart
from simple veriﬁcation and correction of data entry. As table 7.1 shows,
the latter part of the sample period produces the greatest number of ob-
servations. This is one indication of how fast this industry was growing.8
Approximately 21 percent of the observed plans have an hourly limit,
and the majority of those are accompanied by a marginal price for usage
over that limit. Over time the universe of ﬁrms and plans grows, and the
speeds oﬀered increases. At the start of the sample, prices are only given
for 14.4k connections. By the end of the data, 28.8k and 56k have been in-
troduced, and there are price observations at 64k and 128k integrated ser-
vices digital network (ISDN) speeds as well as a small number of observa-
tions of T1 connection prices.9 For limited plans, the hours included in the
plans continue to increase over time. The number of plans with limitations
is decreasing over time as a proportion of the sample. The pattern in the
mean of monthly prices is not easy to discern.
Greenstein (2000b) uses a more comprehensive source of data with a
diﬀerent format and examines contracting practices for only 1998. In that
data, approximately 59 percent of ﬁrms quote only one price schedule, ap-
proximately 24 percent quote two price schedules, and 17 percent quote
three or more. Of the single price quotes, approximately 26 percent are for
limited prices. In this data set, 71 percent of the observations are ﬁrms
quoting only one price, 26 percent quote two prices, and the remainder
quote three or more prices. This is also highlighted in table 7.1, where the
average is 1.2 price-plan observations per ﬁrm. The diﬀerence between the
data here and in Greenstein (2000b) seems to be that here we have more
ﬁrms who quote only one plan and fewer ﬁrms that quote more than two
plans. We conclude that the data set represents a subset of the plans oﬀered
by each provider because the publishing format limited the variety of plans
that an ISP could list.
One of the weaknesses of this data set is the lack of quantity measures of
subscribers and usage. Without usage data, there is no way to weight the
price observations in the calculation of an ideal price index. At the same
time, as noted previously, we would be quite skeptical of an outcome using
such weighting. We discuss this further in the following.
We construct our index assuming that most ﬁrms were responsive to the
same technological trends. We are conﬁdent that qualitative change found
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8. Consider the publishing pattern of ISP information in Boardwatch.In 1993–1995, the list
of ISPs is relatively short and is included in the magazine, but by 1996 the market is growing
rapidly and the listings are published in a separate directory that is updated quarterly. By
1998, changes in the market have slowed enough that the directory is only updated and pub-
lished semiannually. By 1999, the directory is updated on an annual basis.
9. ISDN stands for integrated service digital network. It is a standard for transferring data
over phone lines at 128k and requires both the phone line and the user to upgrade appropri-
ately. Unlike the dial-up connections whose prices we study in this paper, a T1 line refers to a
direct and fast connection, one that brings the pipe to the user’s premise, usually to a business.at one ﬁrm spread to others quickly. Another way to say this is as follows:
it is as if we are assuming that the measured improvement at the small ﬁrms
is informative about the unmeasured improvements at the large. In a com-
panion paper, we partly test this assumption by examining the sensitivity
of price estimates to the age of the ISP, which proxies for the durability of
incumbency and stable market presence. We ﬁnd it makes sense to do so
(see Stranger and Greenstein 2004).
We do not think this assumption makes sense after 2000. After the con-
solidation of AOL’s leadership and its merger with Time Warner, AOL be-
gins to follow its own path. This is also increasingly true for MSN after the
browser wars ended (in 1998) and after the entry of the free ISPs, such as
NetZero, whose spectacular growth ceases after 2001. Moreover, the rate
of unmeasured improvement in features of dial-up service begins to decline
after the dot-com crash in spring of 2000 (though introduction of new fea-
tures does not end after that, to be sure). As noted, the lack of market share
is more problematic for a stable dial-up market, which, arguably, begins to
emerge after 1998, and obviously emerges when adoption of the Internet
slows at households, as it does by 2001 (NTIA 2001). Thus, we did not col-
lect data after early 1999.
7.4 Elementary Price Indexes
The most elementary price index is displayed in table 7.2. It does not
adjust prices for any diﬀerences of quality over time. The means of the
monthly prices trace a sharp upward path from 11/1993 to 5/1996 with
an even sharper fall from 5/1996 to 8/1996, followed by small increases to
1/1998 and another steep fall in 1/1999. The medians also decline over
time, but the changes are discrete.
The fundamental problem with the data presented in table 7.2 is that the
observations in each time period reﬂect very diﬀerent service goods. For
example, the outlying mean of prices in May 1996 is due to the inclusion of
high speed contracts. Table 7.1 shows that more than 581 contracts from
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Table 7.2 Nominal price index: Mean and median of monthly price—Full sample
Time Mean Median Plans
Nov. 1993 30.84 30.00 25
Jan. 1995 38.86 30.00 47
May 1996 71.08 28.00 1,275
Aug. 1996 20.02 19.95 2,822
March 1997 21.40 19.95 3,813
Jan. 1998 39.13 19.95 5,659
Jan. 1999 19.29 19.95 5,568May 1996 are ISDN contracts, which Boardwatchreports in that issue (and
then never again).
Table 7.3shows that homogenizing the sample does reduce the variation
in the calculated means and medians. The price index based on the means
now only rises from 11/1993 to 1/1995 and falls for the remainder of the
sample period. This rise is persistent throughout the price indexes in the
paper. It is discussed in more detail in a later section. The index based on
the median falls early in the sample period and then remains steady for the
remainder. This is indicative of the growing homogeneity across ﬁrms and
plans in the later part of the sample.
7.4.1 Alternative Unweighted Matched Models
A procedure such as matched models compares products that exist in two
adjacent periods. This could be an improvement, but it suﬀers because it ig-
nores the introduction of new products (at least until they have existed for
two periods). This method also ignores the disappearance of older or obso-
lete products because there is no natural comparison to the product after its
last year. If quality is increasing, then matched models will overstate the pe-
riod-to-period index number, biasing upward the measured price change.
Using the matched observations, it is possible to compute the values of
the Dutot, Carli, and Jevons indexes (see table 7.4). Given a number of
prices for matching services, represented as P i,t,10 these formulas are used
for the indexes. More precisely, to construct the matched-model indexes,
we matched price plans where ﬁrmi, speedj at timet are matched with ﬁrmi,
speedj at timet 1.
Table 7.5 reports results for an analysis for this strict matching, where
both ﬁrms and speeds must match for a plan to be included in the calcula-
tion.11 The hypergrowth and turnover of the industry in the ﬁrst few years
Pricing at the On-Ramp to the Internet 211
Table 7.3 Nominal price index: Mean and median of monthly price—Speed 28.8k
and below
Time Mean Median Plans
Nov. 1993 30.84 30.00 25
Jan. 1995 38.86 30.00 47
May 1996 22.64 19.95 694
Aug. 1996 20.02 19.95 2,822
March 1997 19.80 19.95 3,367
Jan. 1998 19.77 19.95 3,972
Jan. 1999 19.01 19.95 2,562
10. The i subscript designates the price plan and t subscript designates the time period.
11. Even the strict matching ignores any change in hours. We have ignored situations in
which a plan switched between limited and unlimited.results in relatively few matches in the 1993–1996 period. In 1996, 510
plans12 from 5/1996 are matched into the 8/1996 part of the sample. From
1996 to 1997, a similarly large proportion of plans match. Although the ab-
solute number of matching plans remains high, the proportion of plans
that are matched decreases toward the end of the sample.
It has been noted that the Carli index generally overestimates the index
level, and this seems to be conﬁrmed in the results in table 7.5 (Diewert
1987). This is because a single large or extreme value of P 1/P 0 swamps small
values of P 1/P 0when averaged. The simplest explanation is that this price ra-
tio is unbounded above (price increases can exceed 100 percent), but the ra-
tio is bounded below (price decreases can only be 100 percent) to zero. The
Dutot index is nothing more than a comparison of the mean prices of the
matched products. Because it is a simple average, the Dutot index is also
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Table 7.4 Dutot, Carli, and Jevons indices
Index Formula
Dutot IDutot Mean ratio of the prices




Geometric mean of price ratios















∑iP i,t  
∑iP i,t–1
Table 7.5 Matched model: Strictly matched observations
Indices
Date No. of matches Dutot Carli Jevons
Nov. 1993 1.00 1.00 1.00
Jan. 1995 15 1.34 1.72 1.30
May 1996 5 0.58 0.57 0.53
Aug. 1996 535 0.95 1.06 0.98
March 1997 2,599 0.99 1.03 0.99
Jan. 1998 3,561 0.97 1.01 0.99
Jan. 1999 2,691 0.94 1.02 0.96
Cumulative index 0.67 1.10 0.64
12. Of the 1,283 total plans in 5/96, only 702 can possibly match a plan in 8/1996 because
the remaining 581 plans are either 64k or 128k plans that are not reported for any ﬁrms in the
8/1996 data.susceptible to inﬂuence by large outlying data. The Jevons index is quite
diﬀerent. As a geometric average, the Jevons index works very eﬃciently in
a large sample to reduce the impact of outlying observations.
The results suggest that prices are declining throughout the sample pe-
riod, with especially dramatic changes arising in between January 1995
and May 1996, though the sample is quite small for that time period. The
notable exception is the Carli index, which shows price increases in nearly
every period except May 1996, where the sample is very small. The average
annual growth rate (AAGR) for the Jevons and Dutot indexes for the en-
tire period is –7.8 percent. In all cases, the Jevons and Dutot indexes agree
on direction of price change, despite diﬀering on the exact magnitude of
the change. These results are intriguing and suggest that more precise qual-
ity controls will yield interesting insights.
7.4.2 Determinants of Price
Before proceeding to examine hedonic regressions and the associated
price indexes, we motivate the selection of the hedonic price model. The
speed and duration of the plan are important as are complementary service
oﬀerings. Contract length and setup costs may also be important, but they
are not recorded in this data. Firm quality, experience, and the competitive
environment are also potential determinants of price.
One of the key developments in ISP service oﬀerings over the 1993–1999
time period is the move from limited and metered plans to largely ﬂat-rate un-
limited usage plans. As noted earlier, in 1993, when ISPs began to oﬀer ser-
vices to consumers, there was little need for unlimited plans. In table 7.6, we
show the mean ﬁxed monthly cost of Internet access in this sample of ISPs. In
each year, the mean price for limited contracts is below the mean price for
unlimited contracts. These diﬀerences are all statistically signiﬁcant, with 
p-values less than 1 percent. The table also illustrates the shift away from lim-
ited plans over the 1993–1999 time frame. At the outset, the limited plans
make up roughly 50 percent of the sample plans. By 1999, limited plans make
up just over 10 percent of the plans in the sample. In 1999, limited plans are,
on average, $0.91 per month less expensive than unlimited plans.
In table 7.7, we continue to examine the eﬀect of plan limitations on ISP
pricing. The data in the table indicate that for nearly every year, there is a
persistent pattern to the mean prices and the hourly limits. The lowest
prices are from the contracts that include ten hours or less in the ﬁxed price.
As the hourly limits expand, so do the mean prices. This is true across all
years (except for 1/1995), and the monotonic relationship is maintained
until the limits exceed 100 hours. Hour limitations above 100 hours appear
to have no obvious relation to price that is consistent across the observa-
tional periods in the sample.
Survey data from March 2000 report that 93.4 percent of users have
monthly usage of eighty-two hours or less, and 90 percent of users have
Pricing at the On-Ramp to the Internet 213monthly usage of sixty-ﬁve hours or less (Goldfarb 2004). Thus, it is not
surprising that limitations higher than 100 hours have little eﬀect on ISP
price. Comparing the higher-limitation mean prices with the unlimited
plans in table 7.6, we observe that it is clear that these high-limitation plans
are not priced very diﬀerently than the unlimited plans.
Other relevant variables are in table 7.8. Connection speed is another im-
portant dimension of Internet access. Over the full sample, there are ob-
servations from price plans that range from 14.4k at the low end up to some
prices for T1 speeds (1.544Mbs) at the upper end. As noted earlier, these
speeds should be given a broad interpretation. The changing nature of user
behavior inﬂuenced the marginal returns to faster connections.13
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Notes: SD   standard deviation. All of the diﬀerences between means are signiﬁcant at p-
values of 1 percent or smaller.
13. Of course, the other argument is that as connection speeds have improved, content pro-
viders have begun to oﬀer richer content that uses higher transmission bandwidth.There are a number of other measures in the data set that could signal
ISP quality. More specialized types of access services being oﬀered by an
ISP could signal the technical expertise of their staﬀ and their reputation
for quality and adoption of leading technology. While there are many dif-
ferent ways to proxy for quality, we, for the most part, do not employ them
in our hedonic analysis.14 In part, this is due to data limitations. More-
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Table 7.7 Descriptive statistics of nominal prices by hourly limitation
Hourly limitations (hrs)






Mean 16.69 38.74 26.23 47.48 33
SD 3.25 19.32 5.82 38.93
N 7482 1
May 1996
Mean 12.59 15.31 20.11 22.43 21.41 22.94 22.86 25.48 30.43
SD 7.85 5.31 7.03 6.31 9.17 5.72 6.42 5.14 40.29
N 70 34 28 39 24 37 32 23 18
Aug. 1996
Mean 11.28 13.80 17.87 21.13 21.05 22.33 21.02 20.82 20.41
SD 6.52 5.34 8.71 7.51 6.27 6.89 6.08 5.08 5.62
N 163 119 105 122 122 135 122 81 43
March 1997
Mean 10.44 13.46 17.65 19.52 20.61 21.85 20.82 21.07 19.29
SD 4.91 5.35 10.48 6.66 6.86 6.64 5.83 4.75 5.41
N 141 99 102 109 130 152 130 114 65
Jan. 1998
Mean 10.15 13.12 15.74 19.33 20.25 22.74 20.95 21.26 20.84
SD 5.15 5.85 5.28 6.56 6.79 14.73 5.49 4.85 11.06
N 123 91 126 110 135 170 152 140 101
Jan. 1999
Mean 9.65 10.69 16.10 15.97 18.70 21.01 20.11 20.44 19.15
SD 6.29 2.76 4.77 5.48 4.73 6.37 5.10 4.56 4.45
N 30 34 38 33 47 69 112 135 87
Notes: SD   standard deviation. Survey data from March 2000 in Goldfarb (2004) shows that 93.4 per-
cent of users have monthly usage of 81.7 hours or less, 90 percent of users use 65 hours or less. So limi-
tations at or above 80 hours were probably not binding at all until recently and then only for a very small
percentage of users.
14. We explored using such factors as whether the ISP provided national coverage, whether
they provided additional services and some coarse measures of capacity, such as ports or T1
line backbone connections. These largely did not predict as well as the factors we left in the
hedonic analysis. In addition, some of these were not available in all time periods, resulting in
us using nonnormalized measures of qualitative change over time.over,as we show in the following, however, we employ a random-eﬀects es-
timator that correlates errors at an ISP over time. This will capture a por-
tion of any unobserved quality that is correlated at the same ﬁrm.15
7.4.3 Hedonic Price Indexes
Hedonic models can be used to generate predicted prices for any prod-
uct (i.e., bundle of characteristics) at any given time. The ﬁrst hedonic
model that we will estimate is
(1) ln P ijt   0    tYearijt   1Limitedijt   2 9dHrlyijt  Limitedijt
   1 5dSpeedijt  εijt,
where the subscripts designate ﬁrm i, plan j, at time t. To divide the hourly
limitations into indicator variables, we examined the frequency plot of the
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15. In our companion paper (Stranger and Greenstein 2004), we will control for quality
with vintage and age eﬀects. For more on measuring quality at ISPs, see Augereau and Green-
stein (2001) and Greenstein (2000a,b, 2002).
Table 7.8 Descriptive statistics for hedonic regression explanatory variables:
Full sample
Variable No. of observations Mean SD Min. Max.
hrs10 19,217 0.028 0.165 0.000 1.000
hrs20 19,217 0.020 0.140 0.000 1.000
hrs35 19,217 0.021 0.144 0.000 1.000
hrs50 19,217 0.022 0.145 0.000 1.000
hrs80 19,217 0.024 0.153 0.000 1.000
hrs100 19,217 0.029 0.169 0.000 1.000
hrs150 19,217 0.029 0.167 0.000 1.000
hrs250 19,217 0.026 0.158 0.000 1.000
isdn 11,964 0.504 0.500 0.000 1.000
limited 19,217 0.212 0.409 0.000 1.000
price 19,209 29.163 100.845 0.000 3,200
speed 19,217 43.392 91.607 14.400 1,544
speed14 19,217 0.003 0.059 0.000 1.000
speed28 19,217 0.699 0.459 0.000 1.000
speed56 19,217 0.261 0.439 0.000 1.000
speed64 19,217 0.018 0.134 0.000 1.000
speed128 19,217 0.015 0.120 0.000 1.000
speedT1 19,217 0.004 0.060 0.000 1.000
yr93 19,217 0.001 0.036 0.000 1.000
yr95 19,217 0.002 0.049 0.000 1.000
yr96a 19,217 0.067 0.250 0.000 1.000
yr96b 19,217 0.147 0.354 0.000 1.000
yr97 19,217 0.198 0.399 0.000 1.000
yr98 19,217 0.294 0.456 0.000 1.000
yr99 19,217 0.290 0.454 0.000 1.000hourly limits. Those divisions and frequencies are shown in table 7.9. Note
that the use of indicator variables provides ﬂexibility for the coeﬃcient es-
timates.
The speciﬁcation in equation (1) was estimated for the whole pooled
sample and for each pair of adjacent time periods. Regression results are
reported in table 7.10. In all cases, the standard errors are robust standard
errors with corrections for clustering. Because of the abundance of data be-
tween 1995 and 1999 and because of the similarity of pricing strategies
across ISPs in a given year, we expect most of the coeﬃcients to be tightly
estimated. In general, we also expect the speciﬁcations for adjacent time
periods to be superior to the pooled speciﬁcation.
We observe in the data that over time ISPs oﬀer increasingly fast con-
nection speeds. Unlimited plans have become more prevalent over time,
while the hours allowed under limited plans have increased over time.
These trends also indicate increases in “quality” over time. In the adjacent
period models, the time indicator variable is only being compared to the
previous period. In the pooled models, each coeﬃcient on the time indica-
tor variables represents a diﬀerence in price relative to the omitted time pe-
riod (11/1993). In the pooled model, the coeﬃcients should all be negative,
and the coeﬃcients of each succeeding period should be more negative
than the previous one because each successive coeﬃcient estimate repre-
sents an accumulated price decline.
Limited plans should have a negative impact on prices, but that impact
should be decreasing as the number of hours allowed under the plan in-
creases. For the regression, this means that we expect the diﬀerence be-
tween the coeﬃcients Hrs10   L and Limited to be negative. Each diﬀer-
ence should be smaller in absolute value as Limited is compared to
higher-level buckets, but the diﬀerences should remain negative (or ap-
proach zero—indicating that a high-limit plan is really no diﬀerent than
an unlimited plan).
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Table 7.9 Frequency counts for limited hours bins









hrgt250  250 314
Notes: Each hourly limitation includes the upper boundary but not the lower boundary. The
















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.The expected sign of the estimated coeﬃcients on the speed indicator
variables varies depending on which speed variable is omitted although in
all cases we expect that higher-speed plans should have higher (more pos-
itive) coeﬃcients than lower-speed plans.
The regression results based on equation (1) appear in table 7.10. The
largest hourly limitation buckets have been discarded from the full model,
so we focus on the coeﬃcients of the restricted model and the accompany-
ing adjacent period regressions. In the restricted regression (second col-
umn), all estimated coeﬃcients are signiﬁcant predominantly at the 1 per-
cent or 5 percent level. The coeﬃcients on each of the speed variables
conﬁrm the previously given hypothesis. The coeﬃcients for the higher
speeds exceed the coeﬃcients for the lower speeds, and the pattern is mo-
notonically increasing. The diﬀerences between the hourly limitation vari-
ables coeﬃcients and the coeﬃcient on limited also conﬁrm the previously
given hypothesis. Speciﬁcally, plans with a limited number of hours are
priced at a discount to unlimited plans, but this discount diminishes as the
number of included hours increases.16
The coeﬃcients on the time indicator variables agree largely with the pre-
viously given hypotheses. Apart from the period from 11/1993 to 1/1995,
the estimated coeﬃcients indicate that quality-adjusted prices were falling,
and the coeﬃcients become successively more negative as time passes,
consistent with the hypothesis described earlier.
There are two anomalies regarding the time indicator variable. The dif-
ference between the coeﬃcients on year95 and year96a is very large (indi-
cating that 5/1996 prices are 40 percent of the level of 1/1995 prices). Thisdra-
matic large price decline needs to be investigated further, which we do in
the following.
One interesting result from the regression is that prices appear to in-
crease on a quality-adjusted basis from 11/1993 up to 1/1995. This is a re-
curring pattern through many of the models. It can be explained by the fact
that the nature of Internet access changed during the intervening time pe-
riod. In 11/1993, the connections that were oﬀered were all unix-to-unix
copy (UUCP) connections that were capable of exchanging ﬁles, news-
groups, and e-mail but had no interactive features. By 1/1995, all of the
plans in the data are for serial line Internet protocol (SLIP) access, which
is a more highly interactive connection that has all the capabilities of
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16. After testing the coeﬃcients for each of the hourly buckets, all but the lowest four were
dropped from the model. Results from hypothesis tests (For example, testing H0: Hrs80   L –
Limited   0) indicated that these coeﬃcients were not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from the coeﬃ-
cient on Limited because they added no more information than the Limited variable. In the
unrestricted models (both pooled and adjacent year models), the omitted hourly  Limited in-
dicator variable is for all hourly limits above 250 hours. The omitted speed indicator variable
is for plans oﬀering 14.4k access. The omitted time period indicator variable (year) is for 11/
1993.UUCP plus additional features (including multimedia capabilities).17
When the quality increase is the same across all of the sample products,
then it cannot be identiﬁed separately in an hedonic regression from the
time period indicator variable. Thus, in 1/1995 prices are higher than in 11/
1993, but it is because Internet access technology has fundamentally im-
proved. Because all the ISPs have adopted the new type of access and qual-
ity has increased, there is no heterogeneity in the sample and no way to con-
trol for the quality change.
The ﬁnal six columns in table 7.10 display results from the adjacent
period regressions. The pooled model is a signiﬁcant restriction. In the
pooled model, intercepts may vary across time, but the slopes with regard
to the characteristics are restricted to be equal across periods. The adjacent
period models relax this restriction so that the slopes are restricted to be
equal only across two periods in any model. In the latter years of the data,
this restriction does not aﬀect the estimated coeﬃcients much. The restric-
tion does matter in the early years of the data. The estimate on Limited and
some of the speciﬁc hour limitations varies paired-year to paired-year. As
we have an abundance of data for later years and not in early years, we lose
degrees of freedom with the adjacent year regressions during the earliest
part of the sample, when we most need it.
Although some of the coeﬃcients among the adjacent period models are
statistically insigniﬁcant, the majority of coeﬃcients conﬁrm the stated hy-
potheses. The hourly limitations and speeds aﬀect price in the same way as
the pooled model. The price increase in 1/1995 is indiscernible because al-
though the coeﬃcient has a positive sign, it is not signiﬁcant. The remain-
ing interperiod indicators are of negative sign and the steep change in price
from 1/1996 to 5/1996 is still present and very signiﬁcant.
The coeﬃcients from the hedonic regression model in equation (1) lead
to a calculation of the estimated price indexes. These estimates are a con-
sequence of the form of the model, plus a correction for the bias from ex-
ponentiating estimates of equation (1).18 The models estimated in table
7.10 lead to estimated price indexes in table 7.1, where 11/1993 is our base
time period. These are easily reconverted to period-to-period indexes. The
models in table 7.10 that consider adjacent time periods also lead directly
to estimates of the period-to-period indexes.
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17. Looking carefully at the data and the advertisements, we observed that it is clear that
ﬁrms were promoting SLIP accounts as a premium service (as opposed to UUCP). The data
seem to indicate that they were charging a premium for it as well. Because there is no hetero-
geneity among the 1/1995 plan options, it is impossible to identify this eﬀect and separate it
from the time period constant.
18. See the discussion in Berndt (1991). The correction involves adding half of the squared
standard error of the regression to the simulated price, correcting for the nonzero expectation
of an exponential normal error. Sometimes this correction can make a big diﬀerence to the es-
timate for the price index. See Pakes (2002) for such an example. In our case it did not make
much diﬀerence to the estimated price index.The results are shown in table 7.11. The table shows that the cumulative
quality-adjusted index declines 58 percent to 0.422 in 1/1999 when com-
pared to 1.00 in the base period, 11/1993. The individual period-to-period
indexes display large variation during the initial periods, but then moder-
ate to a 1–10 percent decline per period thereafter.19 The calculations from
the adjacent year regressions are largely the same as the results from the
restricted model. The exception is the 11/1993 to 1/1995 index, which dis-
plays a less extreme rise during the time period under the adjacent years
method.
The extreme drop in the index from 1/1995 to 5/1996 is still present and
deserves an explanation. Two factors produce this drop. First, there is a
large diﬀerence in the number of ﬁrms. The observations from January
1995 describe a couple dozen ISPs selling connections to the Internet for
purposes of using a Mosaic browser, or a beta version of the Netscape
browser, and basic e-mail client. By May of 1996, most of the new entrants
are small ISPs selling connections for the Netscape browser and e-mail.
Second, by the spring of 1996, AT&T WorldNet has entered home service
and the market is heading toward a twenty-dollar price point for basic ser-
vice at 28k speeds. Even without controlling for quality, table 7.6 shows
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Table 7.11 Direct price indices calculated from hedonic speciﬁcation eq. (0.1)
Model Restricted 93/95 95/96a 96a/96b 96b/97 97/98 98/99
Regression 
coeﬃcients
Jan. 1995 0.332 0.058
May 1996 –0.643 –0.968
Aug. 1996 –0.748 –0.098
March 1997 –0.757 –0.028
Jan. 1998 –0.784 –0.035
Jan. 1999 –0.863 –0.073
Period-to-
Indices Cumulative period 93/95 95/96a 96a/96b 96b/97 97/98 98/99
Nov. 1993 1.000
Jan. 1995 1.394 1.39 1.06
May 1996 0.526 0.38 0.38
Aug. 1996 0.473 0.90 0.91
March 1997 0.469 0.99 0.97
Jan. 1998 0.457 0.97 0.97
Jan. 1999 0.422 0.92 0.93
19. It is diﬃcult to compare all of the adjacent period indices. Each time period is of diﬀer-
ent length, so for accurate and easier comparison, it would be correct to annualize the
changes.that prices declined during this period for both unlimited and limited
plans. However, table 7.6 does not control for precise levels of limits. With
such raw data, it is not a surprise that estimated price declines by more than
half once hedonic estimates control for the same level of limits.
This ﬁnding is consistent with popular perceptions about the growth in
the Internet, usually timed to Netscape’s initial public oﬀering (IPO) in Au-
gust 1995. To our surprise, the price declines do not stop after the spring of
1996. We also ﬁnd a 20 percent decline in price per unit of ISP quality for
the thirty-three-month period between spring 1996 and early 1999.
7.4.4 Hedonic Price Indexes with Random Eﬀects
The data set covers very few characteristics of each plan or product, and
there are undoubtedly unmeasured elements of quality that are missing
from the model speciﬁed in equation (1). One concern is that unmeasured
quality at an ISP is roughly the same across contracts and across years. In
other words, if an ISP guaranteed high-quality service (e.g., large modem
banks that rarely have busy signals) or oﬀers the same enticements to all its
customers (e.g., large e-mail accounts), then this quality will be unmeasured
for contracts coming from the same ﬁrm. Because of the (unbalanced) panel
nature of the data set, the ﬁrm-speciﬁc unmeasured quality can be at least
partially corrected using a random-eﬀects model, where the unmeasured er-
ror is assumed to be the same for all contracts oﬀered by one ﬁrm.
In this case, the regression model given above in equation (1) will be
changed by adding a ﬁrm-speciﬁc error term ( i).
(2) ln P ijt   0    tYearijt   1Limitedijt   2 9dHrlyijt  Limitedijt
   1 5dSpeedijt   i   εijt
This speciﬁcation will emphasize within variation in contracts in situations
where we observe multiple contracts from the same ﬁrm. Because much of
the data comes from small ﬁrms who do not appear often in the data set, it
was diﬃcult to predict whether this speciﬁcation will change the estimates
much.
We have estimated both the ﬁxed- and random-eﬀects speciﬁcations of
model (2)—using the standard subroutines in Stata. The regression results
are shown in table 7.12. The Breusche-Pagan test indicates that the hy-
pothesis that var( i)   0 can be rejected with better than 1 percent cer-
tainty. The Hausman speciﬁcation test indicates that the random-eﬀects
speciﬁcation is preferred.20 We therefore examine the random eﬀects re-
sults in further detail.
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20. Intuitively speaking, it is easy to see why random eﬀects is preferred in this data set. The
ﬁxed-eﬀect model throws out all the observations where an ISP has one contract. In contrast,
the random-eﬀects speciﬁcation employs the variation between these ISPs who oﬀer only one





















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.The random-eﬀects regression results does not diﬀer from the earlier re-
sults much except in one key place. The main diﬀerence is that the drop in
prices ascribed to 1/1995 to 5/1996 period is dampened. The pattern
among the time period indicator variables is maintained. The signiﬁcance
and pattern among the plan limitations ﬁts with earlier hypotheses and fol-
lows the pattern of the earlier results. The estimated coeﬃcients on the
speed indicator variables also follow the pattern outlined in the preceding
hypotheses and reconﬁrm the results from the earlier regression. Table 7.12
also reports the adjacent period regression results. They follow the same
pattern of the earlier results with, again, the main diﬀerence being a damp-
ened drop in the index from 1/1995 to 5/1996.
Using the regression results from the random-eﬀects restricted model
and the random-eﬀects adjacent period model, we have recalculated the
cumulative and period-to-period indexes in table 7.13, which are biased
predictors under the stochastic speciﬁcation. Even then, the results are
qualitatively similar. The cumulative index drops from 1.00 in 11/1993 to
0.51 in 1/1999, imply that the quality-adjusted prices fell by 49 percent over
this period. As before, the period-to-period indexes swing wildly in the ini-
tial periods but then settle to steady declines of almost 7 percent per year
on average. The notable diﬀerence between the random-eﬀects model re-
sults and the earlier results is shown in the period-to-period index from 1/
1995 to 5/1996. Without random eﬀects, the index declined to 0.38 over this
single period. Taking other unmeasured elements of ﬁrm quality into ac-
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Table 7.13 Direct price indices calculated from estimation of hedonic eq. (0.2)
Model Restricted 93/95 95/96a 96a/96b 96b/97 97/98 98/99
Regression 
coeﬃcients
Jan. 1995 0.309 0.119
May 1996 –0.505 –0.824
Aug. 1996 –0.575 –0.097
March 1997 –0.579 –0.023
Jan. 1998 –0.603 –0.03
Jan. 1999 –0.674 –0.064
Period-to-
Indices Cumulative period 93/95 95/96a 96a/96b 96b/97 97/98 98/99
Nov. 1993 1.000
Jan. 1995 1.362 1.36 1.13
May 1996 0.604 0.44 0.44
Aug. 1996 0.563 0.93 0.91
March 1997 0.560 1.00 0.98
Jan. 1998 0.547 0.98 0.97
Jan. 1999 0.510 0.93 0.94count dampens this drop in the price index. In table 7.13, the index only
drops to 0.44. The index values calculated from the adjacent period mod-
els are all nearly the same as the single period indexes derived from the
pooled model. The only diﬀerence is the 11/1993 to 1/1995 index, but this
is an insigniﬁcant coeﬃcient in the adjacent period regression.
It appears, therefore, that ﬁrm-level random eﬀects slightly alter the
quality-adjusted price index, but not by much. The basic reason is that
there is so much entry and exit in the sample. With thousands of new ﬁrms
each year, it is not possible to get a suﬃcient number of repeat observations
on enough ﬁrms to measure changing quality. In more recent times, when
the set of ﬁrms is so stable we would expect this correction to have a greater
eﬀect, but it does not due to the presence of many ﬁrms oﬀering only a
single contract.
We conclude that accounting for measured and unmeasured quality is a
simple and useful addition to the tools for calculating price indexes. It is a
further reﬁnement of the standard hedonic techniques, and it is not diﬃ-
cult to implement. To be sure, in this example, it did not yield a large diﬀer-
ence in estimates, but it was enough to raise questions about the quality of
estimates early in our sample. It is worthwhile to further explore in service
industries where quality of service is correlated across all services oﬀered
by one ﬁrm.
7.4.5 Analysis of Subsample with Speeds below 28.8k
Because change in modem speeds is coincident with the transition to un-
limited plans, we were aware of the possibility that the preceding results
could be an artifact of change in modem speeds. We assessed this empiri-
cally by examining contracts only for 28.8k service.
We have repeated the random-eﬀects modeling (from equation [2]) with
a subsample of plans that oﬀer connection speeds at or below 28.8k. Table
7.14presents the regression results from this subsample. The results shown
for the subsample correspond well to the full sample regression. The co-
eﬃcients display the same pattern as the earlier full sample regressions,
supporting the preceding hypotheses. Quality-adjusted prices decline over
the sample period, with the coeﬃcient for each time period being more
negative than the previous one. The apparent quality-adjusted price rise
from 11/1993 to 1/1995 persists, suggesting that this pattern is not an arti-
fact of the higher-speed plans. The plans with hourly limitations reconﬁrm
the pattern of the full sample.
Additional limited hours are consistently more valuable, with the high-
est limited plans nearly indistinguishable from unlimited plans. In the
pooled regression for the subsample, speed of a plan is handled using a di-
chotomous variable indicating whether a plan is 14.4k or 28.8k. In the re-
gression, the 28.8k plan indicator was the omitted category. The only result
in this subsample that conﬂicts with the earlier results is the coeﬃcient on












































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.14.4k speed plans. Recall the earlier argument that put forward the hy-
pothesis that faster plans should command a price premium. To be consis-
tent with that hypothesis, the coeﬃcient on Speed14 should be negative
(because Speed28 is the omitted dichotomous variable). However, in table
7.14, this estimated coeﬃcient is positive and statistically signiﬁcant.
Coeﬃcient estimates from the adjacent period regressions are also
shown in table 7.14. Similar to the pooled model, these regressions on the
subsample largely reconﬁrm the results from the full sample. Prices decline
over time, and larger limits are more valuable. In the 95/96a regression re-
sults, a similar positive and signiﬁcant coeﬃcient appears for Speed14.
This again is unexpected and runs contrary to the preceding hypothesis.
The remaining adjacent period regressions do not control for speed of plan
because only 28.8k speed plans are considered in the remaining part of the
subsample.
Using the regression results from the random-eﬀects restricted model
and the random-eﬀects–adjacent-period model, we have recalculated the
cumulative and period-to-period–quality-adjusted price indexes; they ap-
pear in table 7.15. The results are consistent with the results from the full
sample. The cumulative index reveals that prices in this subsample drop
from 1.00 in 11/1993 to 0.48 in 1/1999. This implies that the estimated qual-
ity-adjusted prices have dropped by 52 percent over the sample period.
This index is consistent with the full sample cumulative index, which
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Table 7.15 Direct price indices calculated from estimated coeﬃcients in hedonic eq. (0.2): 28.8k
speed plans only
Model Restricted 93/95 95/96a 96a/96b 96b/97 97/98 98/99
Regression 
coeﬃcients
Jan. 1995 0.305 0.049
May 1996 –0.604 –0.937
Aug. 1996 –0.677 –0.073
March 1997 –0.697 –0.02
Jan. 1998 –0.704 –0.007
Jan. 1999 –0.738 –0.036
Period-to-
Indices Cumulative period 93/95 95/96a 96a/96b 96b/97 97/98 98/99
Nov. 1993 1.000
Jan. 1995 1.357 1.357 1.050
May 1996 0.547 0.403 0.392
Aug. 1996 0.508 0.930 0.930
March 1997 0.498 0.980 0.980
Jan. 1998 0.495 0.993 0.993
Jan. 1999 0.478 0.967 0.965dropped by 49 percent over the same period. The adjacent period calcula-
tions are consistent with the full sample results. The price index increases
between the ﬁrst two periods, which is followed by a sharp decline and then
steady annual declines of 1–7 percent thereafter.
In summary, repeating the analysis of the random-eﬀects estimation of
equation (2) on a subsample of plans with speeds at or below 28.8k yields
results consistent with the full sample. This suggests that the treatment of
the hourly limitations in the higher-speed plans is not signiﬁcantly skewing
the results for the full sample. It also suggests that although many new en-
trants appeared over time oﬀering higher-speed plans, the pattern of
quality-adjusted prices was not diﬀerent between the “old” and “new”
providers. The most important conclusion is that the unobserved limits
for the high-speed plans are not aﬀecting the overall results.
7.4.6 Weighted Hedonic Price Indexes
As noted earlier, we were skeptical of calculating a price index with mar-
ket shares or revenue shares of the product or service. However, even with
such skepticism, we would still prefer to calculate such an index and see
what diﬀerence, if any, such weighting makes. Unfortunately, the Board-
watch ISP pricing data did not contain such information. Because the list-
ings are organized by area codes served, we considered using the number
of area codes served by each ISP as a coarse market share weighting. How-
ever, close inspection of this procedure reveals that it is fraught with prob-
lems.
First, even in the best of times, it would be a coarse measure because
population density is not uniform across area codes and intra-area code
market shares are not evenly split across population areas. Moreover, the
number of potential area codes in which an ISP can oﬀer service is capped
at the maximum number of area codes in the United States, just over 200
(and growing slightly over the years of the sample). So the number only
captures a diﬀerence between extremes, such as local and national ISPs.
Prior to 1995, all ISPs were local, so the number does not really weight be-
tween ISPs until after 1995.
Second, the interpretation of the area code variable changes when many
facilities-based ﬁrms initiated programs to rent their backbones and mo-
dem banks to others, who could in turn oﬀer access elsewhere in the coun-
try. This is especially common in the later years of our sample (1997–1999),
rendering the area code variable almost meaningless as a measure of mar-
ket share. That is, the footprint of area code coverage for many ﬁrms be-
came disconnected from ownership of facilities. Hundreds of ﬁrms adver-
tised a national footprint in 1998 and 1999, even small ISPs with only a few
customers who had just entered service.
We conclude, therefore, that the area codes provide equal weight of all
ISPs prior to 1995 and a meaningless weight after 1997 and beyond. We
228 Greg Stranger and Shane Greensteinalso conclude that the area code variable does not provide a consistent in-
terpretation over time. Hence, we have abandoned the proposal of using
number of area codes as a measure of market size or share.
Another (and simpler) alternative is to weight the plans based on the
connection speed oﬀered. Such data is available from the Graphics, Visu-
alization, and Usability (GVU) lab WWW surveys (Georgia Institute of
Technology 1997). The GVU laboratory at the Georgia Institute of Tech-
nology has conducted a WWW users survey semiannually since January
1994. The surveys cover a broad range of topics but, one portion of the sur-
vey inquires about online services, Internet usage, and speed of connection
to the Internet. The GVU has collected information on Internet connec-
tion speeds since 1995. Their data are shown in table 7.16.
The split of plans between 28.8k and 56k in the 1997–1999 periods of the
data set roughly mirrors the data in the GVU survey. Taking 28.8k and
33.6k to be equivalent speed plans, the comparative proportions are shown
in table 7.17. The only substantial diﬀerence between our data and the
GVU survey occurs in 1997. It appears that in 1997, the Boardwatch data
overrepresent the prevalence of 56k connections by about 2.5 times. It is
clear that the proportions in 1998 and 1999 are roughly the same. Because
1997 was not a year of dramatic change in measured contracting behavior,
such as hourly limitations, the impact on a recalculated index is minimal.21
We also considered diﬀerent schemes that alter the index more directly
as a function of whether the ISP is young, old, exiting, or innovating with
a new product or service. These issues delve into questions about the inter-
action between the changing industrial organization of this market and
the pricing of ﬁrms, a topic on which we focus in our companion paper
(Stranger and Greenstein 2004).
7.5 Conclusion
Internet service providers are a necessary component of Internet infra-
structure. They enable businesses and individuals to connect to the Inter-
net. The earliest history for ISPs dates back to late 1992-early 1993. This
paper investigates pricing trends in this nascent industry over the time pe-
riod from 1993 to 1999, with attempts to incorporate adjustment for qual-
ity change.
Using a new data set, we have computed a variety of price indexes, rang-
ing in sophistication from very crude averages to quality-adjusted ones
based on hedonic models. The results show decisively that ISP prices have
been falling rapidly over time. The bulk of the price decline is in the early
years of the sample, especially the period between early 1995 and spring of
1996, but a signiﬁcant and steady decline continues throughout. We con-
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.clude that ignoring aspects of quality underestimates the price declines. It
also alters the timing of the measured declines.
We view this paper as only one small step in a much larger research en-
terprise, measuring the economic beneﬁts from improvement in the Inter-
net. During the latter half of the 1990s, the Internet underwent dramatic
changes. The quality of what users got from the Internet skyrocketed. Over
the next half decade, many users adopted the Internet who had never
used it.
Constructing a cost-of-living index for the user’s experience would face
many challenges. Such an index would have to measure the change in the
cost of living arising from the growth of the use of the Web, as well as the
economic change in user experience from the rapid infusion of e-mail and
browsing into everyday life. Not trivially, no price index could possibly ac-
complish that goal without accounting for changes in speed, changes in
availability, changes in the quality of standard contract features, changes
in reliability and other nonprice dimensions of use, changes in the size of
the network eﬀects, and other features of user experience.
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